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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses the relationship between the probability of being acquired, 
firm performance and governance structures. The acquired firms were all fully 
quoted on the London Stock Exchange and the acquisitions took place between 
1990-1993. They were matched by a sample of non-acquired quoted companies. 
The sample was also analysed in terms of hostile and non-hostile acquisitions. 
It was found that the key governance characteristics which differentiated 
between acquired and non-acquired corporations related to the proportion of 
non-executive directors on the board and to whether or not the roles of chief 
executive officer and chairman were combined. It was also found that acquired 
firms were poor performers which suggests that the internal governance 
structures had been ineffective. These results applied to hostile and non-hostile 
targets. The findings support the view that hostile acquisitions are disciplinary 
but cast doubt on the claim that non-hostile acquisitions are purely synergistic. 
The results also support the view that certain governance characteristics are 
effective substitutes for the take-over mechanism as a means of minimising 
discretionary behaviour. 
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, PERFORMANCE AND TAKE-
OVERS: AN EMPIRICAL  ANALYSIS OF UK MERGERS 
 
 
I Introduction 
 
Agency problems occur in public companies because the decision control and 
decision management functions are separated from risk bearing. Decision-
making authority is delegated from the principal to the agent and if the 
objectives of the two groups differ, agency costs will be incurred. However, 
agency theory argues that the monitoring mechanisms available within public 
companies ensure that shareholder rather than managerial interests prevail, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983).  They argue that 
agency costs can be minimised by means of a variety of governance structures 
which reduce the scope for managerial discretion. These structures relate to 
board composition, ownership structure and incentives. If the internal structures 
are ineffective, the market for corporate control acts as a monitoring mechanism 
of last resort, Fama (1980). 
 
Take-over activity may therefore be explained in terms of agency theory. Firms 
with inadequate internal controls are unable to prevent discretionary behaviour 
and will therefore become take-over targets. The failure of the internal controls 
will be reflected in poor financial performance which will attract outside bidders 
who believe they can better manage the firm's resources. This paper analyses 
the relationship between performance, governance structures and take-over 
activity. As well as providing an overall analysis of UK mergers, the 
characteristics of hostile and non-hostile acquisitions are also discussed. 
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section II discusses the empirical evidence 
relating to the various internal and external governance control mechanisms. 
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Section III describes the sample and the variables used with section IV 
analysing the results. Finally section V draws some conclusions. 
 
II Governance mechanisms and the  market for corporate control 
There are two types of governance mechanism, internal and external. The 
internal mechanisms to be analysed deal with board composition, ownership 
structure and incentives. The external monitoring mechanism involves the 
market for corporate control which comes into play when ownership changes. 
This section discusses the extent to which corporate governance may be 
regarded as a substitute for take-overs as a mechanism for ensuring that firms 
pursue shareholder interests. The objective therefore is to highlight governance 
structures which may constitute best practice. Firms which do not implement 
such structures are more likely to experience performance problems and are 
more likely to become take-over targets. The following outline of the main 
recommendations of the Cadbury Committee provides the UK context for the 
discussion. 
 
The Cadbury Committee was set up to investigate the problem of financial 
reporting and to assess the extent to which auditors were able to provide 
safeguards to the users of financial statements. The background to the setting 
up of the Committee was the sudden and spectacular failure of high profile, and 
apparently successful, businesses such as Polly Peck, BCCI and the Maxwell 
empire. These examples illustrated a failure of accountability and effectiveness. 
The Cadbury Report (1992) set out a Code of Practice based upon the concepts 
of openness, integrity and accountability, with shareholder interests being 
central to the Code. The report set out the responsibilities of the executive 
directors, non-executive directors as well as outlining the links which should 
exist between shareholders, board members and auditors. It also identified a 
number of characteristics which were claimed to represent good governance 
5 
practice. These included a separation of the roles of chairman and chief 
executive officer, having a significant presence of independent non-executive 
directors on the board, appointing high calibre non-executive directors and the 
setting up of independent committees to decide top management remuneration 
packages.  
 
These governance structures were deemed to be necessary because the board 
is charged with ratifying and monitoring the most important decisions which 
affect a firm’s direction and performance. The board is therefore responsible 
not only for supervising the actions of the senior management and preventing 
discretionary behaviour, but also for protecting shareholder interests, Fama 
(9180). Three elements of board composition will be discussed, first, the role of 
outside or non-executive directors, second, the combining of the posts of chief 
executive officer (CEO) and chairman and third, the quality of the non-executive 
directors. 
 
First, executive directors are appointed because of their experience, 
specialised skills, expertise and knowledge. However, even with the available 
internal checks and balances there is no obvious way of monitoring the 
activities of a board which consists entirely of executive directors.  
Consequently an additional governance structure, namely non-executive 
directors, is charged with fulfilling this key monitoring role, Fama (1980), Fama 
and Jensen (1983) and Cadbury (1992). A non-executive director's primary 
functions are to encourage senior management to improve corporate 
performance, to offer specialised assistance when required and to monitor 
managerial actions. In spite of this, Main and Johnson (1993) find that UK 
boards are dominated by inside directors who on, average, make up two thirds 
of board membership.  In contrast, Rosenstein and Wyatt (1994) show that 
most US boards have a majority of outside directors.   
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Second, if the internal monitoring mechanisms are to operate effectively, it is 
important that no individual possesses too much power, Cadbury (1992). The 
Committee concluded that combining the roles of chairman and CEO, creates 
a strong power base which could reduce the ability of a board to exercise 
effective control. The Committee therefore recommended that in large firms, 
the key roles of CEO and chairman should be separated. This would allow the 
management of decisions, that is the day-to-day running of the business, to fall 
within the remit of the CEO. The chairman’s responsibilities include the 
development of strategy as well as appraising the performance of the other 
directors. Therefore separating the roles provides a means of separating key 
responsibilities between different office holders and so prevents one person 
gaining too much power within the decision-making body.  
 
It would therefore appear that combining the roles of CEO and chairman is more 
likely to make firms take-over targets because outside management teams will 
perceive the firms to be underperforming. However, Shivdasani (1993) finds 
that combining the roles reduces the probability of being the subject of a hostile 
bid while Boyd (1995) finds that duality has a positive effect on firm performance 
under certain environmental conditions. Further, Baliga, Moyer and Rao (1996) 
show that neither combining the roles nor moving to a dual status affects 
performance. Therefore, although the possibility of misusing power exists, the 
US evidence suggests that not only does this not happen, but combining the 
roles may actually be beneficial if the person provides strong leadership and 
direction. This calls into doubt one of Cadbury’s main recommendations. 
 
Third, the calibre and standing of non-executive directors may also be 
measured by the number of additional directorships they hold. This is 
determined by the market for outside directorships, Fama (1980). If the non-
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executive directors are perceived to be effective monitors of management such 
that corporate performance improves, their value on the external labour market 
will increase. Consequently they will be offered additional directorships on the 
boards of other firms.  Thus the number of additional directorships held by non-
executives may be taken as a proxy for their ability to protect shareholder 
interests. A high number implies that the non-executive director is perceived to 
be an effective board member. However, if the number is low, this suggests 
that the incumbent non-executive directors are either inexperienced or that the 
market does not regard them as being capable of protecting shareholder 
interests. These perceptions are important to the operation of this market 
particularly since outside director remuneration tends to be nominal in nature. 
Thus the market for outside directorships provides an indication of the 
perceived calibre of non-executive directors.  
 
Cadbury (1992) recommends that a maximum of three additional directorships 
should be held, more than this would require too great a commitment of the 
director’s time. Companies which are unable to attract high quality non-
executive directors are therefore more likely to become take-over targets 
because their performance is likely to suffer. Support for this comes from 
Shivdasani (1993) reports a negative relationship between the probability of a 
hostile take-over and the number of additional outside directorships. This 
suggests that the market for outside directorships disciplines poorly performing 
managers and identifies firms which have not been managed in the best 
interests of shareholders. 
 
In addition to board structure, Cadbury proposed that the remuneration 
packages of key directors should be determined by an independent 
Remuneration Committee. This is consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
who maintain that incentives should reduce the agency problem. Support for 
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the view that incentives have a beneficial impact comes from Demsetz (1983) 
who argues that incentives link shareholder and managerial wealth and from  
Murphy (1986) sees incentives as a means of reducing monitoring costs. 
However, it has been argued that incentives may encourage the embellishment 
of company performance by, for example, the adjustment of company accounts, 
Healy (1985). 
 
The evidence suggests that the link between remuneration and corporate 
performance is positive and significant, Main (1994).  This relationship has been 
found to hold for the US, for example Gibbons and Murphy (1992), Kumar and 
Sopariwala (1992), and Mehran (1995), and for the UK, for example Main 
(1991), Main and Johnson (1993) and Conyon and Leech (1994). In addition, 
Ingham and Thompson (1994) find that high chief executive pay, as measured 
by the efficiency wage, is associated with above average performance in the 
mutuality sector.  Although this particular result may be sector specific, they 
argue that the concept of efficiency wages is a powerful incentive mechanism 
which has received relatively little attention. In contrast, Gregg et al (1993) 
found a link between director compensation and firm size rather than firm 
performance. It would appear therefore that  incentives do influence corporate 
performance and hence affect the market for corporate control. The range of 
incentives and the variety of measures of executive compensation used in the 
studies indicates that this is an area which requires further analysis. Given the 
increased disclosure of the composition of remuneration packages, and the 
apparent importance of bonuses, we look at the effectiveness of share options 
as a corporate governance incentive mechanism. 
 
Another means of reducing discretionary behaviour relates to the extent to 
which blocks of shares are held. These blocks may be held internally by 
directors or externally by institutions. Inside shareholders combine the decision-
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making function with the ownership of shares. Thus, as inside shareholdings 
increase, the interests of decision makers and shareholders should converge, 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). This reduces any potential conflict of objectives 
and hence encourages shareholder wealth-maximising behaviour. This is 
supported by Mikkelson and Partch (1989) who find that target firms have 
significantly lower inside shareholdings than non-targets. In addition, Walkling 
and Long (1984) find lower management share ownership in hostile bids 
compared with non-hostile bids. Shivdasani (1993) also demonstrated that 
firms acquired by means of hostile bids had lower inside shareholdings than 
non-acquired firms whilst Davis and Stout (1992) report that family control 
reduces the probability of being acquired. Thus the evidence suggests that 
firms with low internal shareholdings are more likely to become take-over 
targets. 
 
Large outside shareholders are regarded as an effective monitoring mechanism 
for a number of reasons. For example, they have a vested interest in minimising 
any asymmetry of information which may exist and  will therefore vote in 
accordance with their own interests, Jarrell and Poulson (1987). In addition to 
the monitoring role, Schleifer and Vishny (1986) also argue that large outside 
shareholders assist the market for corporate control simply by being willing to 
sell their shares should an appropriate bid be made. They therefore have an 
incentive to monitor the behaviour of managers which should solve the free-
rider problem identified by Grossman and Hart (1980). 
 
However, Ambrose and Megginson (1992) reported that the levels of outsider 
shareholdings have no effect on the probability of becoming a take-over target. 
Similarly, Davis and Stout (1992) found that outside institutional shareholdings 
had no effect on the probability of being acquired. In contrast, Shivdasani (1993) 
found that large external shareholdings significantly increased the probability of 
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receiving a hostile bid. The weight of evidence therefore indicates that external 
shareholders do not act as effective monitors and that the asymmetry of 
information problem is not resolved. One reason for this may be, as Mayer 
(1995) observes, that there is no compelling reason why the employees of the 
institutions, themselves agents, should act like principals.  
 
If the governance structures discussed above fail, corporate performance is 
likely to suffer and the firm is more likely to become a take-over target. Fama 
(1980) sees the market for corporate control operating as a last resort because 
of the costs involved in integrating organisations. This is supported by Davis 
and Stout (1992) who found that  a high valuation ratio reduced the probability 
of take-over and by Bannister and Riahi-Belakaoui (1992) who showed that 
acquired firms exhibited poor pre-take-over performance. Morck et al (1988) 
found that poor performance increased the probability of a hostile take-over. 
Zantout (1994), in an analysis of US corporate raiders, reported some support 
for the market for corporate control being an efficient external control 
mechanism of last resort. However, in a study of Australian corporate raiders, 
Eddey (1990) reported no difference in the financial performance of raider and 
non-raider target firms. This indicates that aggressive acquirers have been 
unable to identify poorer performers than firms involved in normal acquisition 
activity. It has also been argued that the threat of take-over is unlikely to remove 
all managerial discretion, Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen and Ruback 
(1983).  Even if discretionary behaviour does occur, it may not be costly to 
shareholders, Jensen and Meckling (1976). However, the growth of anti-take-
over strategies may result in some market distortion which would increase the 
costs of discretionary behaviour, Sundarsanam (1991). Thus the evidence is 
equivocal and the extent to which the market for corporate control identifies 
poor performers and comes into operation when the internal monitoring 
mechanisms have failed is open to debate.  
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The discussion has identified a number of issues dealing with the relationship 
between corporate governance and the take-over mechanism. First, the 
Cadbury Committee’s concerns about the consequences of certain governance 
structures: second, the role of incentives in reducing discretionary behaviour: 
third, the effectiveness of holding blocks of shares: and fourth, the extent to 
which targets are poor performers. These issues will be addressed below. 
 
III DATA, VARIABLES AND HYPOTHESES 
Data were gathered on 94 UK public companies which were acquired during 
the period 1990-1993, of these 71 were non-hostile acquisitions and 23 were 
hostile. The proportion of hostile acquisitions, 24%, is consistent with that which 
occurred in the 1980s in the UK, Sundarsanam (1991). The sample includes 
only wholly independent public companies which were fully quoted on the 
London Stock Exchange. The sample covered all sectors of the economy. A 
control sample of non-acquired firms was constructed which matched the 
acquired firms by company type, size and sector, as defined by the Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC). Corporate governance data were taken from the 
Price Waterhouse Corporate Register1. The Register provides information on 
board composition, the names of executive and non-executive directors, the 
dates of their appointment, director shareholdings and institutional 
shareholdings. Later editions of the Register were used along with the FAME2 
database to ensure that the control sample included only public companies 
which had remained independent and had not subsequently been acquired. 
Profit data for the year prior to acquisition were obtained from FAME. In addition 
to firm specific profit data, industry average profitability was also calculated at 
the two digit SIC level. 
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Manne (1965) argues that poor performance will make a firm a take-over target. 
Other managers will seek to acquire the assets with the objective of using them 
more effectively. The market for corporate control is driven by the relationship 
between potential and actual performance. Thus: 
 
Probability(take-over) = f(potential financial performance-actual performance) 
                             = f(gap) 
The gap cannot, however, be directly observed. The conclusions of the 
Cadbury Committee imply that the gap will be smaller when firms adopt good 
governance structures and larger if the governance structures are ineffective. 
The combination of bad governance practice and poor performance will make 
a firm more likely to become a take-over target because they indicate that 
shareholder interests are not being pursued. Firms which exhibit good 
governance practice and good performance are less likely to be acquired 
because they are following policies which appear to be consistent with 
shareholder interests. If this distinction is found to hold, then it may be argued 
that effective corporate governance is a substitute for take-overs as a means 
of achieving better performance.  
 
The variables are defined as follows: 
 The dependent variable, ACQUIRED, was given the value one if a firm had 
been acquired and zero if it had not. 
 
The independent variables are: 
CEOCHAIR - is a binary variable. If the roles of the Chief Executive Officer and 
the Chairman are filled by a single individual the variable has the value of one 
and zero if they are not.  The coefficient’s expected sign is positive. This is 
because the effectiveness of the board as an internal governance device will 
be perceived by bidders to have been compromised by the roles not being 
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separated. This will increase the probability of being acquired because 
combining the roles implies the potential for better performance, something 
which could be achieved by means of acquisition. 
 
PROP - measures the proportion of executive directors on the board. The 
higher the proportion, the more difficult it will be for the non-executive directors 
to influence board decisions. This will permit greater managerial discretion and 
so increase the probability of acquisition. The coefficient will therefore be 
positive. 
 
BIG - this is the percentage sum of the three largest external shareholders.  If 
groups of shareholders can act in a common interest, their combined 
shareholding may be sufficient to affect a board’s actions. A coalition of the 
three largest external shareholders would provide an indication of the extent to 
which a corporation was owner controlled. The coefficient will be positive 
because large shareholders have the incentive to monitor the board’s activities. 
If there is dissatisfaction with the board, they will be willing to sell their shares. 
 
XORD - measures the total percentage ordinary shares held by the executive 
directors. The coefficient will be negative because the higher the shareholding 
the closer the interests of directors and principals, hence the lower the 
probability of being acquired. 
 
NXDIR - this variable measures the mean number of additional outside 
directorships held by the non-executive directors of the firms. The expected 
sign is negative indicating that the non-executive directors appointed by the 
acquired firms are not perceived to be capable of providing the necessary 
expertise or control required to maximise shareholder wealth. Thus a low value 
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for additional directorships indicates a weak governance mechanism which will 
increase the probability of a firm being acquired. 
 
XDIR - measures the mean number of additional outside directorships held by 
the executive directors.  If a firm’s executive directors are regarded as being 
effective, there exists a greater probability of them being asked to serve on the 
board of other firms in a non-executive capacity. The expected coefficient will 
be negative because executive directors who are regarded as being ineffective 
will be more likely to manage firms which become take-over targets. 
 
XOPT - this measures the share options held by the executive directors as a 
percentage of the total issued ordinary share capital. Share options are 
becoming an important element of director compensation and XOPT is a 
measure of its effectiveness as a incentive mechanism. Its coefficient should 
be negative showing that lower holdings of share options increase the 
probability of being acquired. 
 
 PROFIT 1 - is measured by  the return on capital employed and defined as 
profit before tax / net assets. The coefficient will be negative because poorer 
performance will increase the probability of being acquired. 
 
PROFIT 2 - this measures firm profitability relative to the industry average.3 The 
coefficient will also be negative indicating that relatively poor performers are 
more likely to become acquired. 
 
The model may be written: 
Pr(AD) = a0 +a1CEOCHAIR + a2PROP + a3BIG - a4XORD - a5NXDIR - a6XDIR 
- a7XOPT - a8PROFIT 
where 
15 
Pr (AD) = the probability of being acquired  
PROFIT = PROFIT1 or PROFIT2 
 
However, if the sample is partitioned by type of merger, hostile or non-hostile, 
the hypothesised relationships should change. The agency model implies that 
all mergers are disciplinary in nature because they signal the desire of outside 
management to replace the inefficient incumbent management team. 
Shivdasani (1993) has argued that hostile bids are evidence of ineffective 
internal control mechanisms. Bhide (1989) found that 64% of hostile bids were 
expected to result in improved profitability by means of efficiency gains. Hostile 
acquisitions are therefore claimed to identify governance structures which have 
failed to protect shareholder interests. This suggests that sub-optimal 
governance structures lead to poor performance and that they are replaced by 
means of hostile take-overs, Weisbach (1993). This is consistent with the above 
hypotheses.  
 
Non-hostile bids, however, are more likely to be synergistic rather than 
disciplinary, Morck et al (1988). Both parties recognise potential benefits such 
as increased market power, marketing economies, improved technical 
expertise and better research and development. Bhide (1989) found evidence 
of expected synergistic benefits from non-hostile acquisitions. He also found 
that, post-acquisition, targets of hostile bids experienced a greater turnover of 
management that targets of friendly bids. Bhide (1989) further found  that the 
targets of hostile bids performed worse than the targets of non-hostile bids. 
Friendly acquisitions are therefore less likely to be disciplinary in nature given 
that the objective is not to replace incompetent management.  
 
The distinction between hostile and non-hostile acquisitions is therefore 
important because they appear to be undertaken for different motives. The 
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distinction therefore has important implications for the agency model. If non-
hostile targets are selected for reasons other than the identification of poor 
management, this suggests that they exhibit desirable governance 
characteristics consistent with those laid down in the Cadbury Code of Practice. 
We would therefore expect there to be no difference between the governance 
structures of firms which had been the subject of non-hostile bids and those 
which had not been acquired. This would provide support for the view that non-
hostile targets were selected because they possessed certain characteristics 
which the bidding firm specifically required.  
 
IV Results 
Univariate Analysis 
Table 1 provides an overview of the data for the governance and performance 
variables. The analysis has been split into three parts: the first looks at the 
sample as a whole, the second deals with hostile take-overs and the third with 
non-hostile take-overs. The average sales of the whole acquired sample are 
£127.1 million and for the non-acquired sample it is £147.1 million. The 
difference is not statistically significant. The average sales of firms acquired in 
hostile take-overs was £198.1 million and for non-hostile take-overs it was 
£104.1 million: the average sales of the non-acquired samples was £213.2 
million and £126.6 million respectively. Neither difference was significant which 
indicates that the governance variables were not picking up size effects. 
 
Table 1 shows that for all three samples, target firms are more likely to combine 
the roles of CEO and chairman and have a significantly higher proportion of 
executive directors than non-targets. In addition, hostile targets have a 
significantly lower number of additional directorships held by their non-
executive directors. The difference was not significant for non-hostile targets. 
Thus the board characteristics of acquired firms, particularly hostile targets, are 
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consistent with these firms experiencing monitoring problems because they 
focus authority and power in the hands of the boards’ internal members. 
However, contrary to expectations, the board structure differences also apply 
to non-hostile targets. 
 
There is limited evidence that shareholdings, whether internally or externally 
held, are different for acquired and non-acquired firms. There is a weak result 
on XORD, at the 10% level, for hostile acquisitions which shows that the 
executive directors of acquired firms have significantly lower shareholdings 
than those of non-acquired firms. Although XOPT, the proportion of share 
options held by executive directors of acquired firms, was lower than the 
proportion held by executive directors of non-acquired firms for all three 
samples, the difference was not significant. 
 
For all three samples, targets have a significantly lower absolute mean 
profitability than non-targets. Although the non-hostile result is significant only 
at the 10% level, there is no difference between the profitability of hostile targets 
and non-hostile targets. This indicates that, contrary to expectations, all targets 
had been the subject of disciplinary bids. However, when industry relative 
profitability is used, performance differences become insignificant across all 
samples. This illustrates the sensitivity of performance definitions and the 
importance of distinguishing between absolute and relative profitability. 
 
The differences in the governance variables are therefore consistent with 
monitoring difficulties. This is supported by the profitability results which also 
provide evidence of underperforming by acquired firms, whether they be hostile 
or non-hostile targets. The results also suggest that absolute rather than 
relative performance is important in identifying a potential target. 
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Multivariate Analysis 
Logistic regression was used to estimate the combined impact of the 
performance and corporate governance mechanisms on the probability of being 
acquired. Table 2 details the logit estimates for the whole sample with Model 1 
including the absolute profit measure and Model 2 the industry relative measure. 
Both models are significant at the 1% level and the correct classification rates 
for each are acceptable. Of the governance variables, CEOCHAIR, NXDIR, 
XORD and PROP are significant for both models with the coefficient signs are 
as hypothesised. The positive coefficient on CEOCHAIR means that firms 
which combine the roles of chief executive officer and chairman are more likely 
to be acquired than firms which separate them. This implies that the target firms 
had too much power concentrated in the hands of one person, a finding which 
supports one of the key elements of the Cadbury Committee’s Code of Practice. 
The positive sign on PROP shows that acquired firms are likely to have fewer 
non-executive directors. This provides further support for the hypothesis that 
target firms lacked adequate internal monitoring. Thus the composition of the 
board had a significant effect on the probability of being acquired, particularly 
where the balance of power favoured the executive board members. 
 
The negative sign on NXDIR shows that the non-executive directors of acquired 
firms have significantly fewer outside directorships than have the non-executive 
directors of non-acquired firms. This supports the view that the non-executive 
directors of acquired firms are perceived to be less effective monitors of 
shareholder interests will receive fewer requests to serve on other boards.  
 
The negative sign on XORD shows that firms are more likely to become take-
over targets the lower the proportion of a firm’s ordinary shares owned by the 
executive directors. In contrast the presence of large external shareholdings, 
BIG, does not affect the probability of acquisition. This casts doubt on the view 
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that large external shareholdings solve the free rider problem by providing 
effective monitoring. XOPT is insignificant showing that this element of a 
remuneration package has no incentive effect. 
 
The results show the importance of performance definition. In Model 1, acquired 
firms have significantly lower absolute profitability than non-acquired firms. 
However, in Model 2 which uses industry relative profit, the differences are 
insignificant. This indicates that the performance of potential targets is 
assessed in absolute rather than relative terms. 
 
Results for the hostile and non-hostile sub samples are given in Table 3. In 
terms of hostile bids, Model 1 shows that there is evidence of poor performance 
and inadequate monitoring, with the coefficients all having the expected signs. 
Targets of hostile bids have significantly poorer absolute profitability (PROFIT 
1), have a significantly higher proportion of executive directors on the board 
(PROP) and are more likely to combine the roles of CEO and chairman 
(CEOCHAIR). These are examples of undesirable governance practice, 
according to Cadbury (1992). The executive directors of hostile targets also 
have lower holdings of ordinary shares (XORD) and are more likely to hold 
lower proportions of share incentives (XOPT). The governance characteristics 
are therefore indicative of ineffective internal and external monitoring of the 
board’s actions, particularly since BIG is insignificant. As a consequence 
shareholder interests are not being safeguarded and the market for corporate 
control comes into play. 
 
However in Model 2, NXDIR, the number of outside directorships held by the 
non-executive directors also becomes significant, but only at the 10% level. As 
hypothesised, the negative coefficient shows that the lower the number of 
additional directorships held, the greater the probability that a firm will become 
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the target of a hostile bid. XOPT now becomes insignificant which, together with 
the weak result in Model 1, suggests that the proportion of shares held as share 
options by executive directors has little effect on the probability of acquisition. 
Therefore share options are not an effective incentive mechanism for directors. 
Model 2 further shows that the targets were not underperformers in relation to 
their respective industries. However, neither are they good performers and it 
may be that their governance characteristics create the perception of 
underperforming. Thus with more effective monitoring, performance may be 
improved to the benefit of shareholders. These results therefore offer indirect 
support for Shivdasani’s (1993) explanation of hostile acquisitions in terms of 
their disciplinary nature. 
 
Table 3 also shows similar results for non-hostile targets. In Model 1, targets 
are more likely to have the roles of CEO and chairman combined and have a 
higher proportion of executive directors on the board. These characteristics are 
consistent with examples of bad governance practice according to Cadbury 
(1992). In addition there is some evidence that non-hostile targets also suffer 
poorer absolute profitability given that PROFIT1 is negative and significant at 
the 10% level. The same board composition variables, CEOCHAIR and PROP, 
are significant in Model 2, but once again PROFIT2, relative profitability, is 
insignificant. The results are therefore similar to those for hostile targets and 
suggests that UK non-hostile acquisitions incorporate disciplinary and 
synergistic elements. 
 
A potential specification problem occurs when there is a relationship between 
governance structures and performance. For example, whereas a number of 
studies have found that board composition had an important effect on firm 
performance, (Rosenstein and Wyatt 1994, Brinckley et al 1994 and Bernhart 
et al 1994), others have found that it had no effect, (MacAvoy et al 1983 and 
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Hermalin and Weisbach 1992). In addition, Ezzamel and Watson (1993) 
showed that the proportion of outside directors had little effect on corporate 
profitability in the UK. The analysis of the impact of large inside shareholdings 
on performance has also produced conflicting results. For example, Morck et al 
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) found a non-linear relationship 
between managerial shareholding and corporate performance. However, Stulz 
(1988) reports that corporate value was positively related to the voting rights of 
managers for low shareholdings but negatively related for large shareholdings. 
Wruck (1989) argues that increasing inside shareholdings enables 
management to gain control of a firm.  This is then associated with the 
introduction of entrenchment policies, which include anti-take-over strategies 
such as poison pills and shark repellents which may be regarded as serving the 
interests of management rather than shareholders. However, as Table 4 shows, 
the correlation coefficients are low enough to indicate that this potential 
specification problem does not apply and that there is no bias in the regression 
estimates. 
 
V Conclusions 
The paper deals with the governance and performance characteristics of 
acquired and non-acquired quoted UK public companies. The characteristics 
analysed relate to board composition, ownership structure, director 
compensation and profitability. The results show that probability of becoming a 
take-over target is affected by governance structures and performance. There 
is strong evidence that board composition has a significant impact on the 
probability of acquisition. It was also found that acquired firms are likely to have 
lower absolute profitability than non-acquired firms.  
 
It has been shown that it is important to distinguish between absolute and 
relative profitability when assessing the effect of performance on the probability 
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of being acquired. If absolute profitability is used as a measure of performance, 
it was found that hostile bids in the UK are disciplinary. Poor performance is 
combined with weak internal governance structures which make it difficult for 
adequate monitoring to be undertaken. The boards of acquired firms do not 
therefore appear to be discharging their responsibilities effectively. In particular 
there is inadequate ratification and monitoring of important decisions. The 
interpretation of the board characteristics variables is critical when taken 
alongside the poor performance result. The significance of the variables 
CEOCHAIR and PROP suggests the failure of the internal monitoring 
mechanisms given the power of the internal members of the board. The poor 
performance combined with inappropriate governance structures provided the 
signals to other management teams to mount successful hostile bids for the 
firms.  
 
It was also found the executive directors of acquired firms had significantly 
lower shareholdings than those of non-acquired firms. This, coupled with the 
fact that they also held a significantly lower proportion of share options, 
suggests that the directors were not motivated by the pursuit of shareholders’ 
interests. However, the results also suggest that targets are not poor 
performers when compared with similar sized quoted firms in the same industry. 
Thus raiders take the absolute performance rather than relative performance 
as the signal for mounting a hostile bid.  
 
It has also been shown that the same key governance characteristics are 
significant for non-hostile acquisitions, CEOCHAIR and PROP. This is 
combined with weak evidence that non-hostile targets are poor performers.  
Both of these results are contrary to expectations given the view that non-
hostile acquisitions are claimed to be synergistic, Morck et al (1988) and Bide 
(1989). There are a number of possible explanations for this result. First, the 
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distinction between synergistic and disciplinary motives is too simplistic and it 
becomes blurred when take-overs are non-hostile. Second, it may be that in 
general, boards act in the interests of shareholders when a bid is received. For 
example, combining the roles of CEO and chairman  creates a substantial 
power base from which to persuade a board that a non-hostile bid should be 
recommended to shareholders. The dual roles may also make it easier to 
negotiate and arrange a non-hostile bid. This would be consistent with the 
results of event studies which show that shareholders of target firms benefit 
from positive abnormal returns when bids are announced. Thus for non-hostile 
bids the duality of roles may actually promote increases in wealth for target firm 
shareholders, and would be consistent with the board adopting a stewardship 
approach to its responsibilities. Third, as the sample shows, most acquisitions 
of UK public corporations are non-hostile. There may therefore be cultural 
reasons why bids tend to be accepted rather than contested. Fourth, some 
accepted bids may be the result of approaches to white knights if an unwelcome 
bid had been received. Fifth, management may have a better chance of keeping 
their jobs if an acquisition is not contested. 
 
None of the results found that external shareholdings affected the probability of 
being acquired. This suggests that these shareholders had not been unhappy 
with management. However, given the poor corporate performance,  this 
indicates that they had not been effective in their monitoring of the companies. 
In terms of hostile acquisitions, there is only weak evidence that the non-
executive directors of acquired firms are regarded as less effective than those 
of non-acquired firms. There was no difference however, in the mean numbers 
of additional directorships held by the executive directors of firms which were 
hostile targets and non-acquired firms. There was also to be no difference in 
the calibre of executive and non-executive directors of firms involved in non-
hostile acquisitions. 
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It has been shown that acquired firms exhibit certain governance characteristics 
which have been identified as being undesirable by the Cadbury Committee. 
Non-acquired firms are less likely to exhibit these features. However, the 
Committee’s recommendations raise a number of issues. First, a firm’s 
performance may benefit from a strong and committed dual CEO/chairman. It 
is not certain that a person in that position would by definition misuse their 
authority. Second, the extent of the independence of the non-executive 
directors is unclear. It would seem unlikely that a board would appoint non-
executive directors who were clearly out of step with the thinking and objectives 
of the other directors. This would be particularly true if a dominant 
CEO/chairman wanted to maintain a position of power on the board. Third, non-
executive directors are appointed on a part-time basis which means that they 
may not possess sufficient knowledge and expertise of the breadth of a 
company’s activities to fully be aware of what is going on. This calls into 
question their ability to provide informed independent advice.  
 
The analysis deals with the position the year prior to acquisition. An area for 
further research would be to investigate how board composition changed over 
time and to analyse the problem of board succession. Another area for further 
research is the analysis of non-hostile acquisitions because they exhibit similar 
governance and performance characteristics to those of firms which were the 
subject of hostile bids.  
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Notes 
1. The Price Waterhouse Corporate Register is published by Hemmington Scott 
Publishing Limited. It provides details of board composition, the names of 
directors and the shareholdings of the directors and the main institutions.  
2. FAME is compiled by Jordans and published by Bureau Van Dijk. It provides 
balance sheet and profit and loss information on the main UK firms. It covers 
quoted and private firms. 
3. Industry relative profitability is measured as - 
 Firm % / (industry average %)*100. This is proposed by Platt and Platt (1990). 
It produces stability over time and controls for different industry characteristics. 
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Table 1   
Descriptive Statistics - Analysis of Means 
 
 Whole sample Hostile Sample Non-Hostile Sample 
Variable Target Control t-value  Target Control t-value  Target Control t-value 
CEOCHAIR 0.44 0.16 4.33*** 0.48 0.04 3.78*** 0.42 0.20 2.97*** 
PROP 0.64 0.57 2.93*** 0.68 0.58 1.84* 0.63 0.56 2.29** 
BIG 25.37 26.62 -0.61 23.64 27.02 -0.68 25.92 26.49 -0.25 
 XORD 7.98 10.81 -1.17 3.06 9.82 -1.74* 9.57 11.13 -0.53 
XDIR 0.32 0.52 -1.00 0.15 0.27 -0.99 0.37 0.59 -0.86 
NXDIR 0.66 1.15 -2.63*** 0.67 1.70 -2.44** 0.66 0.97 -1.55 
XOPT 0.87 1.13 -0.95 0.63 1.36 -1.09 0.95 1.06 -0.38 
PROFIT1 5.44 13.27 -2.78*** 4.30 18.43 -2.69*** 5.81 11.60 -1.75* 
PROFIT2 0.02 0.002 1.08 0.01 0.02 -0.62 . 0.03 -0.005 1.24 
 
Notes 
Significance levels: 
 *** = 1% 
 ** = 5% 
 * = 10% 
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Table 2    
 Logit Results - Whole Sample 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
 
       n 
 
188 188 
CEOCHAIR 
 
 
1.352 
(11.84)*** 
1.294 
(11.23)*** 
 
PROP 2.70 
(6.57)*** 
 
2.522 
(6.10)** 
BIG 
 
 
0.002 
(0.017) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
 
XORD -0.024 
(3.69)* 
 
-0.026 
(4.81)** 
XDIR 
 
 
-0.08 
(0.40) 
 
-0.070 
(0.30) 
NXDIR 
 
 
-0.250 
(3.27)* 
-0.299 
(5.04)** 
 
XOPT 
 
 
-0.114 
(1.20) 
-0.056 
(0.32) 
 
PROFIT1 -0.028 
(6.69)*** 
 
 
PROFIT2  1.311 
(0.85) 
 
Constant -1.220 
(2.82)* 
 
-1.364 
(3.74)* 
 
Model Chi-Square 
 
41.93*** 
 
 
35.12*** 
 
Correct %age 
Classification:- 
  
Control 77 76 
Target 72 60 
Overall 74 68 
 
Notes 
1  Significance levels: 
 *** = 1% 
 ** = 5% 
 * = 10% 
 
2  Figures in parenthesis are Wald statistics 
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Table 3     
Logit Results - Hostile and Non-Hostile Sub-Samples 
 
 Hostile Hostile Non Hostile Non Hostile 
Variables  
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 
CEOCHAIR 5.228 
 (2.90)* 
 
3.272 
(5.389)** 
1.037 
(5.99)** 
0.983 
(5.47)** 
PROP 9.307 
(4.95)** 
5.877 
(3.54)* 
 
2.178 
(3.34)* 
2.186 
(3.44)* 
BIG -0.005 
(0.02) 
 
0.017 
(0.38) 
0.005 
(0.10) 
0.003 
(0.05) 
XORD -0.130 
(3.15)* 
 
-0.147 
(2.79)* 
-0.016 
(1.76) 
-0.017 
(2.14) 
XDIR 0.007 
(0.00) 
 
-0.967 
(0.70) 
-0.077 
(0.33) 
-0.059 
(0.22) 
NXDIR -0.596 
(1.32) 
 
-0.594 
(2.78)* 
-0.211 
(1.77) 
-0.236 
(2.24) 
XOPT -0.592 
(2.90)* 
 
-0.314 
(0.61) 
-0.042 
(0.12) 
-0.015 
(0.02) 
PROFIT1 -0.131 
(6.28)*** 
 
 -0.018 
(3.02)* 
 
PROFIT2  -11.222 
(1.82) 
 
 1.91 
(0.94) 
Constant -3.190 
(1.75) 
 
-2.649 
(1.82) 
-1.159 
(1.95) 
-1.286 
(2.47) 
 
Model Chi- 
Square 
 
37.75*** 
 
28.43*** 
 
19.43** 
 
17.85** 
 
Correct %age 
Classification:- 
    
Control 83 87 70 76 
Target 83 84 61 56 
Overall 83 85 65 66 
 
Notes 
1  Significance levels:  
*** = 1% 
 ** = 5% 
 * = 10% 
 
2  Figures in parenthesis are Wald statistics 
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Table 4      
Correlation coefficients 
 
 BIG CEOCHAIR XORD NXDIR PROFIT2 PROP XDIR XOPT 
CEOCHAIR -0.12        
XORD -0.23 0.20       
NXDIR 0.13 -0.09 -0.06      
PROFIT2 0.05 -0.13 -0.04 0.02     
PROP -0.17 0.30 0.24 0.04 -0.006    
XDIR 0.08 -0.10 -0.06 0.002 -0.008 -.012   
XOPT 0.04 -0.04 0.06 0.28 0.01 0.18 0.03  
PROFIT1 -0.005 0.06 0.08 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.16 
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